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Abstract
We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange
commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any con-
nected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism
MG that satisfies some natural conditions of “fairness” and “convenience”.
Let M(m) denote the class of mechanisms MG obtained by varying G on
the commodity set {1, . . . , m}. We define the complexity of a mechanism
M in M(m) to be a certain pair of integers τ(M), pi(M) which represent the
time required to exchange i for j and the information needed to determine
the exchange ratio (each in the worst case scenario, across all i 6= j). This
induces a quasiorder  on M(m) by the rule
M M ′ if τ(M) ≤ τ(M ′) and pi(M) ≤ pi(M ′).
We show that, form > 3, there are precisely three -minimal mechanisms
MG in M(m), where G corresponds to the star, cycle and complete graphs.
The star mechanism has a distinguished commodity – the money – that serves
as the sole medium of exchange and mediates trade between decentralized
markets for the other commodities.
∗In honor of Lloyd Shapley.
†Stony Brook Center for Game Theory, Dept. of Economics; and Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics, Yale University
‡Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
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Our main result is that, for any weights λ, µ > 0, the star mechanism is
the unique minimizer of λτ(M) + µpi(M) on M(m) for large enough m.
JEL Classification: C70, C72, C79, D44, D63, D82.
Keywords: exchange mechanism, minimal complexity, money.
1 Introduction
The need for money in an exchange mechanism has been the topic of much
discussion, and it would be impossible to summarize that literature here. We
give some references that are indicative, but by no means exhaustive. (For a
detailed survey, see [39] and [40].)
Several search-theoretic models, involving random bilateral meetings be-
tween long-lived agents, have been developed following Jevons [21] (see, e.g.,
[3], [20], [22], [23], [24], [25], [27], [42] and the references therein). These
models turn on utility-maximizing behavior and beliefs of the agents in Nash
equilibrium, and shed light on which commodities are likely to get adopted as
money. A parallel, equally distinctive, strand of literature builds on partial
or general equilibrium models with other kinds of frictions in trade, such as
limited trading opportunities in each period, or transaction costs (see, e.g.,
[14], [15], [16], [17], [19], [28], [29], [40], [41], [43]). In many of these models, a
specific trading mechanism is fixed exogenously, and the focus is on activity
within the mechanism that is induced by equilibrium, based again on the
optimal behavior of utilitarian individuals.
Our approach complements this literature in two salient ways, and brings
to light a new rationale for money that is different from those proposed ear-
lier, but not at odds with them, in that the door is left open to incorporate
their concerns within our framework. First and foremost, our focus is purely
on mechanisms of trade with no regard to the characteristics of the individu-
als such as their endowments, production technologies, preferences or beliefs.
Second, no specific mechanism is specified ex ante by us. We start with a
welter of mechanisms and cut them down by four natural conditions and
certain complexity criteria, ultimately ending up with the “star” mechanism
in which money plays the central role.
These mechanisms are Cournotian in spirit1, and the setting for them is
1It is our purpose to see how far matters may develop in an elementary Cournot frame-
work. In particular, note that ex ante there are no “prices” to refer to, upon which a
trader may condition his offers. We do show that prices can be “admitted”, i.e., defined,
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simple, in keeping with our aim of showing that the need for money can arise
at a very rudimentary level. A mechanism M on commodity set {1, . . . , m}
operates as follows. For certain ordered pairs ij, pre-specified by M , each
trader may offer any quantity of commodity i in order to obtain commodity
j. Once all offers are in, the mechanism M redistributes to the traders
the commodities it has received, holding back nothing. The returns to the
traders are calculated by an algorithm2 that is common knowledge. Thus
a mechanism M is characterized by a collection of exchange opportunities
ij, which form the edges of a directed graph G on nodes {1, . . . , m}, and
the algorithm. We assume throughout that G is connected, i.e., M permits
iterative exchange of any i for any j.
At this level of generality, there are infinitely many mechanisms (algo-
rithms) for any given graph G. However, we shall show that only one of
them satisfies some natural conditions of “fairness” and “convenience” (see
Section 3). This special mechanism is denoted MG and is described precisely
in Section 2. It is a striking property of MG that it admits unique prices
3,
which depend only on the aggregate offers by the traders on the various edges
of G, and which mediate trade in the following strong sense: first, the return
to any trader depends only on his own offers and the prices; second, the total
value — under the prevailing prices — of every trader’s offers is equal to that
of his returns. The immediate upshot of price mediation is that the returns
to any trader can be calculated in a transparent manner from the prices and
his own offers.
Thus we are led to consider the class M(m) of mechanisms MG, where G
ranges over all directed, connected graphs on the vertex set {1, . . . , m}. The
cardinality of M(m), though finite, grows super-exponentially in m. However
but this happens ex post once unconditional offers for trade have come into the mecha-
nism. Our mechanisms are thus a far cry from the more complex Bertrand mechanisms,
in which traders use prices alongside quantities in order to make contingent statements to
protect themselves against vagaries of the market (see,e.g., [5], [26]). An analysis analo-
gous to ours might well be possible in the Bertrand setting, but that is a topic for future
exploration.
2There is no presumption that the algorithm be “informationally decentralized”. In-
deed even the return to a simple offer of i, made only via the pair ij, may well depend on
all the offers at every kl ∈ G; and may thus require a lot of information for its computation.
3Prices are to be thought of as consistent exchange rates between commodities, i.e.
the ratios pi/pj. Thus they correspond to rays in Rm++, each of which is represented by a
vector p in Rm++ (identified with all its scalar multiples λp for λ > 0).
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we shall show in Section 2 that if one invokes natural complexity considera-
tions, based on the time needed to exchange any commodity i for j and the
information needed to determine the exchange ratio pi/pj, then the welter
of mechanisms in M(m) is eliminated and we are left with only three mech-
anisms of minimal complexity, namely those that arise from the star, cycle
and complete graphs (Theorem 1). Indeed, provided m is large enough, just
the star mechanism remains (Theorem 2) in which one commodity emerges
endogenously as money and mediates trade across decentralized markets for
the other commodities4.
Our analysis is carried out in the oligopolistic setting of finitely many
traders. However, in Section 7 we show that it readily extends to the
case of “perfect competition”, where there is a continuum of traders and
G-mechanisms induce “price-taking” behavior as in the Walrasian model .
It is worth emphasizing that ours is a purely “mechanistic”, as opposed
to a “utilitarian” or “behavioral”, approach to the emergence of money5. In
the parlance of game theory, we are concerned with the “game form” behind
the game or — to be more precise — with the mechanism that underlies the
game form itself. Indeed, with the same mechanism as the foundation, several
different game forms can be constructed by introducing other considerations,
such as whether netting6 of commodities is permitted or not, and if so to
what extent; or whether certain commodities can be borrowed prior to trade
and on what terms, along with rules for the settlement of debt in the event
of default. These are no doubt important economic issues, bearing on the
“liquidity” in the system and the efficiency of its equilibria. They have been
4To be precise: the price of any commodity 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 , in terms of money m,
depends only on the aggregate offers on edges im and mi; and thus this pair of edges may
be viewed as a decentralized market for i and m, with m mediating between the various
markets.
5There is a faint touch of rationality that we assume regarding the traders, but it
an order-of-magnitude milder than utilitarian (or other behavioral) considerations. See
Remark 11.
6Netting means that if an individual ex ante offers x units of commodity i to the
mechanism, and is ex post entitled to receive y units of i from it, then he is deemed to
owe max {0, x− y} or else to receive max {0, y − x} . In this scenario, one may think that
“offers” consist of promises to deliver commodities, rather than commodities themselves;
and that the mechanism calls upon traders to make (take) net deliveries (receipts) of
actual commodities. But note the a priori need for a mechanism with respect to which
netting can be formulated (or, for that matter, borrowing and default, or any other trade
regulation). Also note that these these regulations do not come without a cost (see Remark
5).
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discussed at length, often in terms of the star mechanism which conforms
to the well-known Walrasian model once there is perfect competition and
“sufficient liquidity” (see, e.g., [8], [10], [13]). However, to even raise these
issues, we first need a mechanism in the background. It is this background
alone that forms the domain of our inquiry .
Our analysis builds squarely upon [9], which provided an axiomatic char-
acterization of the finite set of ”G-mechanisms” (see Section 2), bridging the
gap between the Shapley-Shubik model of decentralized “trading posts”, i.e.,
the star mechanism (see [35], [36], [37]) and the Shapley model of centralized
“windows”, i.e., the complete mechanism (see [34]). Various strategic market
games, based upon trading posts, have been analyzed, with commodity or
fiat money in [6], [30], [31], [32], [35], [36], [37], [38]; most of these papers
also discuss the convergence of Nash equilibria (NE) to Walras equilibria
(WE) under replication of traders. For a continuum-of-traders version, with
details on explicit properties of the commodity money (its distribution and
desirability) or of fiat money (its availability and the harshness of default
penalties), under which we obtain equivalence (or near-equivalence) of NE
and WE, see [8], [10], [13]; and, for an axiomatic approach to the equivalence
phenomenon, see [7].
Strategic market games differ in a fundamental sense from the Walrasian
model, despite the equivalence of NE and WE. In the WE framework, agents
always optimize generating supply and demand, but markets do not clear
except at equilibrium. We are left in the dark as to what happens outside of
equilibrium. In sharp contrast, in the NE framework, markets always clear,
producing prices and trades based on agents’ strategies; but agents do not
optimize except at equilibrium. The very formulation of a game demands that
the “game form”, i.e., the map from strategies to outcomes, be defined prior
to the introduction of agents’ preferences on outcomes; thus disentangling
the physics of trade from its psychology7. Our mechanisms are firmly in
this genre, and indeed form the bases upon which many market games are
built. To be precise: game forms arise from our mechanisms by introducing
private endowments and the rules of trade (including the degree of netting
or borrowing permitted); and strategic market games then arise by further
introducing preferences.
7To put it bluntly, the insistence on a game form pertains to the following situation in
the real world. People exercise choice all the time through their actions; and the world
goes merrily on, by well-defining the outcome of those actions — it does not come to a
standstill until they can explain why they have acted as they did!
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2 The Emergence of Money
Let G be a directed and connected graph8 with vertex set {1, . . . , m}. We
define a mechanism MG as follows. Each trader can use every opportunity
in M, i.e., place arbitrary weights on the edges ij of G, representing his offer
of i for j. Let bij denote the total weight on ij (i.e., the aggregate amount
of commodity i offered for j by all traders). We shall specify what happens
when bij > 0 for every edge ij in G, i.e., when there is sufficient diversity in
the population of traders so that each opportunity is active. Denote b = (bij)
and let Rm++/ ∼ be the set of rays in R
m
++ representing prices. It is well-known
that (with bij understood to be 0 if ij is not an edge in G) there is a unique
ray p = p(b) in Rm++/ ∼ satisfying∑
i
pibij =
∑
i
pjbji for all j. (1)
Note that the left side of (1) is the total value of all the commodities “chasing”
j, while the right side is the total value of commodity j on offer; thus (1) is
tantamount to “value conservation”.
It turns out that (1) has an explicit combinatorial solution, which we now
describe. Let Ti be the collection of all “spanning” trees in G that are rooted
at i (i.e. subgraphs of G in which there is a unique directed path to i from
every j 6= i); and for any subgraph H , define bH =
∏
ij∈H bij ; then we have
9
pi =
∑
T∈Ti
bT . (2)
The principle of value conservation, which determines prices, also de-
termines trade. An individual who offers aij units of i via opportunity ij
gets back rj units of j, where piaij = pjrj. More generally, if a trader offers
8In this paper by a graph we mean a directed simple graph. Such a graph G consists of
a finite vertex set VG, togther with an edge set EG ⊆ VG × VG that does not contain any
loops, i.e., edges of the form ii. For simplicity we shall often write i ∈ G, ij ∈ G in place
of i ∈ VG, ij ∈ EG but there should be no confusion. By a path ii1i2 . . . ikj from i to j we
mean a nonempty sequence of edges in G of the form ii1, i1i2, . . . , ik−1ik, ikj. If k = 0 then
the path consists of the single edge ij, otherwise we insist that the intermediate vertices
i1, . . . , ik be distinct from each other and from the endpoints i, j. However we do allow
i = j, in which case the path is called a cycle. We say that G is connected if for any two
vertices i 6= j there is a path from i to j.
9Formula (2) has a short proof [33] but a long history. It seems to be orginally due to
[18] but has been rediscovered several times (see the discussion in [2]).
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a = (aij) ≥ 0 across all edges of G, he gets a return r(a, b) ∈ Rm+ whose
components are given by
rj(a, b) =
∑
i
(pi/pj)aij (3)
for all j. This completes the definition of the G-mechanism10 MG.
Note that the return to a trader depends only on his offer a and the price
ratios pi/pj , which are well-defined functions of b (unlike the price vector
p = (pi) which is only defined up to a scalar multiple). It might be instructive
to see the formulae for price ratios (and thereby also for returns, thanks to
equation (3)) for specific mechanisms. Let us, from now on, identify two
mechanisms if one can be obtained from the other by relabeling commodities.
There are three mechanisms of special interest to us called the star, cycle,
and complete mechanisms; with the following edge-sets and price ratios:
G Star Cycle Complete
EG {mi, im : i < m} {12, 23, . . . , m1} {ij : i 6= j}
pi/pj bmibjm/bimbmj bj,j+1/bi,i+1 ∗
For the star and cycle mechanisms, the right-hand side of (2) involves a
single tree and, in the ratio pi/pj, several factors cancel leading to the simple
expressions in the table above. However, for the complete mechanism there
is no cancellation and in fact here each price ratio depends on every bij .
The class of G-mechanisms is the set
M(m) = {MG : G is a directed, connected graph on {1, . . . , m}} . (4)
Although finite, M(m) is rather large, indeed super-exponential in m. We
shall see that some natural complexity considerations help cut down its size.
Consider a trader who interfaces with M ∈ M(m) in order to exchange
i for j. A natural concern for him would be: what is the minimum number
of time periods τij (M) needed to accomplish this exchange? We define the
time-complexity of M to be
τ (M) = max
i 6=j
τij (M) . (5)
It is evident that τij (M) is the length of the shortest path in G from i to j
and τ (M) is the diameter of the graph G.
10G-mechanisms may arise naturally in the context of currency exchange, with edges ij
indicating the direct convertibility of currency i to currency j.
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The other concern of our trader would be: how much of commodity j can
he get per unit of i? It follows from equation (3) that he can calculate this
from the state b of the mechanism which determines the price ratio11 pi/pj .
Thus the question can be rephrased: how many components of b does he
need to know12 in order to calculate pi/pj? The table above indicates that it
is easier to compute pi/pj for the star and cycle mechanisms than, say, the
complete mechanism.
To make this notion precise, if f is a function of several variables x =
(x1, . . . , xl), let us say that the component i of x is influential if there are
two inputs x, x′, differing only in the i-th place, such that f (x) 6= f (x′).
Define piij(M) to be the number of influential components of b in the price
ratio function pi/pj . For example, from the expression for pi/pj for the star
mechanism in the previous table, it is clear that piij(M) is 4 unless one of i
or j is m, in which case it is 2. We define the price complexity of M to be
pi(M) = max
i 6=j
piij(M). (6)
We now define a quasiorder  (reflexive and transitive) on M(m) by
M M ′ ⇐⇒ τ(M) ≤ τ ′(M ′) and pi(M) ≤ pi′ (M ′) (7)
We are ready to state our main result13.
Theorem 1 If14 m > 3 then the three special mechanisms are precisely the
11If there is a continuum of traders (see Section 7), his own action has no affect on the
price ratio. Otherwise it affects the aggregate offer and thereby the price ratio, which is
but to be expected in an oligopolistic framework. In either case, equation (3) applies; and
pi/pj is the exchange ratio between i and j.
12And, since he always knows his own offer, this is the same as asking: how many
components does he need to know of the aggregate offer of the others ?
13A word about the numbering system used in this paper: all theorems, remarks, con-
ditions, lemmas etc. are arranged in a single grand sequence. Thus the reader shall see,
in order of appearance: Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Remark 3, Condition 4,. . . . This does
not mean that Condition 4 is the fourth condition; in fact it is the first condition, but it
has fourth place in the grand sequence (and, the marker 4 makes the condition easy to
locate).
14When m = 3, we get a fourth mechanism with complexities 4, 2 identical to the star
mechanism. And when m = 2, we must change 4 to 2 in the table (the three graphs
become identical with complexities 2, 2 for each).
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-minimal15 elements of M(m). Their complexities are as follows :
Star Cycle Complete
pi(M) 4 2 m(m− 1)
τ(M) 2 m− 1 1
This has the following immediate consequence.
Theorem 2 Given any choice of strictly positive weights λ, µ > 0, there
exists an integer m0 such that for m ≥ m0 the star mechanism is the unique
minimizer in M(m) of λpi(M) + µτ(M).
Theorem 2 says that, so long as traders ascribe positive weight to both
time and price complexity considerations, the star mechanism with money
is the unique optimal mechanism as soon as the number of commodities is
sufficiently large.
Remark 3 In fact m0 does not have to be too large. We only require 4λ +
2µ < 2λ + (m − 1)µ and 4λ + 2µ < m(m − 1)λ + µ for the star to beat the
cycle and complete mechanisms, respectively; which may be rearranged
m > 2
(
λ
µ
)
+ 3 and m2 −m >
µ
λ
+ 4
So, for example, if at least 10% weight is accorded to both pi and µ, then
λ/µ and µ/λ can each be at most 9 and the above inequalities will hold if
m > 18 + 3 and m2 −m > 9 + 4; thus m0 = 22 does the job.
Remark 4 Our notion piij(M) of price complexity counts the number of com-
ponents of the market state b that are needed for the computation of price
ratios pi/pj. The difficulty of that computation is not taken into account.
However, even if it were, the star would perform well relative to the other G-
mechanisms. The intuition for this is implicit in our earlier discussion. First
recall that, by equation (3), the returns to the traders are immediate from the
price ratios pi/pj. As for these ratios, they are given by equation (2), which
entails spanning trees of the graph G. For most graphs G this leads to com-
plicated expressions for pi/pj. But, as was said, the star has unique spanning
15M is said to be-minimal in M(m) if there is noM ′ ∈M(m) for which τ(M ′) ≤ τ(M)
and pi(M ′) ≤ pi(M), with strict inequality in at least one place.
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trees for each commodity, with heavy overlaps between them. This enables
cancellations in the right-hand of equation 3, yielding the simple formula
pi/pj = bmibjm/bimbmj (see the first table in Section 2) whose “computational
complexity” is hardly worth the mention.
Remark 5 If “netting” of commodities were permitted, an individual could
trade i for j in one go, instead of trading iteratively along the path that con-
nects i to j. This reduction of time complexity is quite illusory, however. It
requires bookkeeping — carried out by a centralized clearing-house ? — to
determine the net due to, or owed by, any individual across his many trades.
Thus netting simply transfers time complexity to the complexity of bookkeep-
ing. There is another complication with netting. What if someone is unable
to honor his net debts? Are his final holdings to be confiscated? How, and
at what cost? And furthermore how are the confiscated goods to be appor-
tioned among the many claimants? Without being formal about it, it should
be intuitively clear that such a clearing-house is complicated and costly to op-
erate, and yet it is unavoidable if “netting” is to be accomodated; or, for that
matter, borrowing and default, or other variations of the (“value-for-value”
and “on-the-spot”) trade that prevails in our G-mechanisms. More impor-
tantly, note that such variations cannot even be defined except in the context
of some given basic mechanism. Our analysis pertains to basic mechanisms,
which are prerequisite to the variations.
3 Characterization of G-mechanisms
Our analysis above was carried out on the domain M(m). We now show
how to derive M(m) from a more general standpoint. To this end, let us
first define an abstract exchange mechanism on commodity set {1, . . . , m}
and with trading opportunities given by a directed, connected graph G on
{1, . . . , m}. Such a mechanism allows individuals in {1, . . . , n} to trade by
means of quantity offers in each commodity i across all edges ij in G. (Here
m is fixed and n can be arbitrary.) The offer of any trader can thus be viewed
as an m×m non-negative matrix in the space
S = {a : aij = 0 if ij /∈ G, aij ≥ 0 otherwise}
Define
S+ = {a ∈ S : aij > 0 if ij ∈ G}
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Also define
a = (a1, . . . , am)
where ai =
∑
j aij is the i-th row sum of a and denotes the total amount
of commodity i involved in sending offer ai. Let S
n be the n-fold Cartesian
product of S with itself, and (with a = (a1, . . . ,an)) let
S(n) =
{
a ∈ Sn :
n∑
α=1
a
α ∈ S+
}
denote the n-tuples of offers that are positive on aggregate. Also let C = Rm+
denote the commodity space; and Cn its n-fold product.
An exchange mechanism M , for a given set {1, . . . , m} of commodities
and with trading opportunities in accordance with the graphG, is a collection
of maps (one for each positive integer n) from S(n) to Cn such that, if a ∈
S(n) leads to returns r ∈ Cn, then we have
n∑
α=1
a
α =
n∑
α=1
r
α,
i.e., there is conservation of commodities. It is furthermore understood, in
keeping with our concept of opportunity ij, that for an offer a ∈ S whose only
non-zero components are {aij : j = . . .}, the return will consist exclusively of
commodity j.
We shall impose four conditions on the mechanisms which reflect “con-
venience” and “fairness” in trade. The first condition is that the mechanism
must be blind to all other characteristics of a trader except for his offer (and
rules out discrimination on irrelevant grounds):
Condition 6 (Anonymity) Let (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Cn denote the returns from
(a1, . . . ,an) ∈ S(n). Then for any permutation σ the returns from (aσ(1), . . . ,aσ(n))
are (rσ(1), . . . , rσ(n)).
The second condition is that if any trader pretends to be two different
persons by splitting his offer, the returns to the others is unaffected. In
its absence, traders would be faced with the complicated task of tracking
everyone’s offers. It is easier (and sufficient!) to state this condition for the
“last” trader.
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Condition 7 (Aggregation) Suppose a ∈ S(n) and b ∈ S(n+1) are such
that aα = bα for α < n and an = bn+ bn+1 . Let r,s denote the returns that
accrue from a,b respectively. Then rα = sα for α < n.
Anonymity and Aggregation immediately imply that, regardless of the
size n of the population, the return to any trader may be written r(a, b),where
a ∈ S is his own offer and b ∈ S+ is the aggregate of all offers.
Let ν denote his net trade:
ν(a, b) = r(a, b)− a
The third condition is Invariance. Its main content is that themaps which
comprise M are invariant under a change of units in which commodities are
measured. This makes the mechanism much simpler to operate in: one does
not need to keep track of seven pounds or seven kilograms or seven tons, just
the numeral 7 will do.
In what follows, we will consistently use a for an individual’s offer and b
for the positive aggregate offer; so, when we refer to the pair a, b it will be
implicit that a ∈ S, b ∈ S+ and a ≤ b.
Condition 8 (Invariance) ν(λa, λb) = λν(a, b) for all a, b and any m×m
strictly positive diagonal matrix λ.
The fourth, and last, condition is that no trader can get strictly less than
his offer (otherwise, such unfortunate traders would tend to abandon the
mechanism).
Condition 9 (Non-dissipation) If ν(a, b) 6= 0, then νi(a, b) > 0 for some
component i.
It turns out that these four conditions categorically determine a unique
mechanism.
Theorem 10 LetM be an exchange mechanism on commodity set {1, . . . , m}
and let G be the (directed, connected) graph induced by the trading opportu-
nities in M. If M satisfies Anonymity, Aggregation, Invariance and Non-
dissipation, then M = MG.
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3.0.1 Comments on the Conditions
Aggregation does not imply that if two individuals were to merge, they would
be unable to enhance their “oligopolistic power”. For despite the Aggrega-
tion condition, the merged individuals are free to coordinate their actions
by jointly picking a point in the Cartesian product of their action spaces.
Indeed all the mechanisms we obtain display this “oligopolistic effect”, even
though they also satisfy Aggregation.
It is worthy of note that the cuneiform tablets of ancient Sumeria, which
are some of the earliest examples of written language and arithmetic, are in
large part devoted to records and receipts pertaining to economic transac-
tions. Invariance postulates the ”numericity” property of the maps r(a, b)
(equivalently, ν(a, b)) making them independent of the underlying choice of
units, and this goes to the very heart of the quantitative measurement of
commodities. In its absence, one would need to figure out how the maps are
altered when units change, as they are prone to do, especially in a dynamic
economy. This would make the mechanism cumbersome to use.
Non-dissipation (in conjunction with Aggregation, Anonymity, and the
conservation of commodities) immediately implies no-arbitrage: for any a, b
neither ν(a, b)  0 nor ν(a, b)   0. To check this, we need consider only the
case a ≤ b and rule out ν(a, b)  0. Denote c = b−a. Then ν(a, b)+ν(c, b) =
ν(a + c, b) = ν(b, b) = 0, where the first equality follows from Aggregation,
and the last from conservation of commodities. But then ν(a, b)  0 implies
ν(c, b)   0, contradicting Non-dissipation.
Remark 11 There is a “touch” of rationality, imputed to the traders, in
these conditions. Non-dissipation implies that commodities are liked and an
uncompensated loss of them is not tolerable. (This is compatible with any
monotonic utility function and hardly very restrictive.) Anonymity rules out
discrimination among traders on extra-economic grounds. Aggregation and
Invariance, as well our notion of the complexity of a mechanism, reflect the
fact that traders find complicated computations inconvenient. These require-
ments are minimalistic and an order-of-magnitude milder than the standard
utilitarian (or other behavioral) considerations. In fact, our mechanisms per-
mit arbitrary utility functions to be ascribed to the traders in order to build
a game (see, e.g., [35], [6] [34] and the references therein).
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3.0.2 Alternative Characterizations of G-Mechanisms
The formula (3) for the return function of a G-mechanism immediately im-
plies
p(b) = p(c) =⇒ r(a, b) = r(a, c) for all a ≥ 0 and b, c > 0 (8)
In [9], a mechanism was supposed to produce both trades and prices, based
upon everyone’s offers; and the property (8) was referred to as Price Media-
tion. It was shown in [9] that M(m) is characterized by Anonymity, Aggre-
gation, Invariance, Price Mediation and Accessibility (the last representing
a weak form of continuity).
An alternative characterization of M(m), which assumes – as we do here
– that a mechanism produces only trades (and no prices), was given in [11].
Here we have presented a simplified version of the analysis in [11], and estab-
lished thatMG arises “naturally” once we assume that trading opportunities
are restricted to pairwise exchange of commodities, i.e., correspond to the
edges of a connected graph G. In contrast, in both [9] and [11], the oppor-
tunity structure G was itself an object of deduction, starting from a more
abstract viewpoint; and is the theme of our forthcoming companion paper
[12], (extracted from [11]).
4 Proofs
4.1 Graphs with complexity ≤ 4
Let G be a connected graph on {1, . . . , m} as in Section 2, and write
pi (G) = pi (MG) , pij (G) = pij (MG) and pi (G) = pi (MG)
If G consists of a single vertex then pi (G) = 0 by definition.
Lemma 12 If G is a cycle then pi (G) = 2.
Proof. Each vertex i in a cycle has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote
its weight by16 ai. For each i we have pi = bG/ai where bG =
∏
ij∈G bij =
∏
i ai
as in (2); hence pi/pj = aj/ai and the result follows.
16This is a departure from our convention heretofore that a shall refer to an individual’s
offer, and b to the aggregate offer; but there should be no confusion.
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By a chorded cycle we mean a graph that is a union G = C ∪P where C
is a cycle and P , the chord, is a path that connects two distinct vertices of
C, but which is otherwise disjoint from C.
Lemma 13 If G = C ∪ P is a chorded cycle then pi (G) = 4.
Proof. Let i be the initial vertex of the path P , then i has two outgoing
edges, ij and ik say, on the cycle and path respectively. Any vertex l 6= i
has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote its weight by al as before. Let
x be the terminal vertex of the path P . If x = j then G has two j-trees,
otherwise there is a unique j-tree; similarly if x = k then there are two
k-trees, otherwise there is a unique k-tree. Thus we get the following table:
x = j x = k x 6= j, k
pj/bG a
−1
j
(
b−1ik + b
−1
ij
)
a−1j b
−1
ik a
−1
j b
−1
ik
pk/bG a
−1
k b
−1
ij a
−1
k
(
b−1ik + b
−1
ij
)
a−1k b
−1
ij
In every case, the ratio pj/pk depends on all 4 variables aj , ak, bij, bik, thus
pi (G) ≥ 4.
On the other hand, since all vertices other than i have a unique outgoing
edge, it follows that if x is any vertex then every x-tree contains all the
outgoing edges except perhaps the edges bij , bik and ax (if x 6= i); thus px
is divisible by all other weights. It follows that for any two vertices x, y
the ratio px/py can only depend on the variables bij , bik, ax, ay. Thus we get
pi (G) ≤ 4 and hence pi (G) = 4 as desired.
Remark 14 A special case of a chorded cycle is a graph T0 with three vertices
that we call a chorded triangle.
3
↑↓ տ
1 −→ 2
p1 b23b31
p2 b12b31
p3 b23 (b12 + b13)
p1/p2 b23/b12
p2/p3 b12b31/b23 (b12 + b13)
p3/p1 (b12 + b13) /b31
For future use we note that for each index j there is an i such that piij ≥ 3.
By a k-rose we mean a graph that is a union C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck, where the
Ci are cycles that share a single vertex j, but which are otherwise disjoint.
Thus a 0-rose is a single vertex and a 1-rose is a cycle. If G is a k-rose for
some k ≥ 2 then we will simply say that G is a rose.
If each cycle in a rose G has exactly two vertices, i.e., is a bidirected edge,
then we say that G is a star.
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Lemma 15 If G is a rose then pi (G) = 4.
Proof. Let G be the union of cycles C1 ∪ · · · ∪Ck with common vertex j
as above. Let a1, . . . , ak be the weights of the outgoing edges from j in cycles
C1, . . . , Ck respectively, and for all other vertices x let bx denote the weight
of the unique outgoing edge at x. It is easy to see that there for each vertex v
of G there is a unique v-tree, and thus the price vectors are given as follows:
pj =
∏
x 6=j
bx, px =
aipj
bx
if x 6= j is a vertex of Ci
Thus we get
pj/px = bx/ai, py/px = bxal/byai if y 6= j is a vertex of Cl
Taking i 6= l, we see that py/px depends on 4 variables, and pi (G) = 4.
Our main result is a classification of connected graphs with pi (G) ≤ 4.
Theorem 16 If G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose, then pi (G) ≥ 5.
We give a brief sketch of the proof of this theorem, which will be carried
out in the rest of this section. The actual proof is organized somewhat
differently, but the main ideas are as follows.
We say that a graph H is a minor of G, if H can be obtained from G by
removing some edges and vertices, and collapsing certain kinds of edges. Our
first key result is that the property pi (G) ≤ 4 is a hereditary property, in the
sense that connected minors of such graphs also satisfy the property. The
usual procedure for studying a hereditary property is to identify the forbidden
minors, namely a set Γ of graphs such that G fails to have the property iff
it contains one of the graphs from Γ. We identify a finite collection of such
graphs. The final step is to show that if G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose
then it contains one of the forbidden minors.
We note the following immediate consequence of the results of this section.
Corollary 17 If G is not a cycle then piij (G) ≥ 4 for some ij.
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4.2 Subgraphs
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph. We say that a graph
H is a subgraph of G if H is obtained from G by deleting some edges and
vertices.
Proposition 18 If G′ is a connected subgraph of G then pi (G) ≥ pi (G′).
Proof. For a vertex i in G′ let p′i and pi denote its price in G
′ and G
respectively; we first relate p′i to a certain specialization of pi.
Let E,E ′ be the edge sets of G,G′ respectively, and let E0 (resp. E1)
denote the edges in E \ E ′ whose source vertex is inside (resp. outside) G′.
Let p¯i be the specialization of pi obtained by setting the edge weights in E0
and E1 to 0 and 1 respectively. Then we claim that
p′i = |F | p¯i, (9)
where F is the set of directed forests φ in G such that
1. the root vertices of φ are contained in G′,
2. the non-root vertices of φ consist of all G-vertices not in G′.
Indeed, consider the expression of pi as a sum of i-trees in G. The spe-
cialization p¯i assigns zero weight to all trees with an edge from E0. The
remaining i-trees in G are precisely of the from τ ∪ φ where τ is an i-tree
in G′ and φ ∈ F , and these get assigned weight wt (τ). Formula (9) is an
immediate consequence.
Now if i, j are vertices in G′, then formula (9) gives
p′i
p′j
=
p¯i
p¯j
Thus the ij price ratio in G′ is obtained by a specialization of the ratio
in G. Consequently the former cannot involve more variables. Taking the
maximum over all i, j we get pi (G) ≥ pi (G′) as desired.
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4.3 Collapsible edges
We write out(k) for the number of outgoing edges at the vertex k. In a
connected graph we have out(k) ≥ 1 for all vertices, and we will say k is
ordinary if out(k) = 1 and special if out(k) > 1. Among special vertices, we
will say that k is binary if out(k) = 2 and tertiary if out(k) = 3.
Definition 19 We say that an edge ij of a graph G is collapsible if
1. i is an ordinary vertex
2. ji is not an edge of G
3. there is no vertex k such that ki and kj are both edges of G.
Definition 20 If G has no collapsible edges we will say G is rigid.
If G is a connected graph with a collapsible edge ij, we define the ij-
collapse of G to be the graph G′ obtained by deleting the vertex i and the
edge ij, and replacing any edges of the form li with edges lj. The assumptions
on ij imply that the procedure does not introduce any loops or double edges,
hence G′ is also simple (and connected). Moreover each vertex k 6= i has the
same outdegree in G′ as in G.
Lemma 21 If G′ is the ij-collapse of G as above, then pi (G) ≥ pi (G′) .
Proof. Let k be any vertex of G′ then k is also a vertex of G. Since i
is ordinary every k-tree in G must contain the edge ij; collapsing this edge
gives a k-tree in G′ and moreover every k-tree in G′ arises uniquely in this
manner. Thus we have a factorization
pk (G) = aijpk (G
′) .
Thus for any two vertices k, l of G′ we get pk (G) /pl (G) = pk (G
′) /pl (G
′)
and the result follows.
We will say thatH is a minor of G if it is obtained fromG by a sequence of
steps of the following kind: a) passing to a connected subgraph, b) collapsing
some collapsible edges. By Proposition 18 and Lemma 21 we get
Corollary 22 If H is a minor of G then pi (H) ≤ pi (G) .
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4.4 Augmentation
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph.
Notation 23 We write H E G if H is a connected subgraph of G, and write
H ⊳ G to mean H E G and H 6= G.
We say that H ⊳ G can be augmented if there is a path P in G whose
endpoints are in H , but which is otherwise completely disjoint from H . We
refer to P as an augmenting path of H , and to K = H ∪P as an augmented
graph of H ; note that K is also connected, i.e. K E G. It turns out that
augmentation is always possible.
Lemma 24 If H ⊳ G then H can be augmented.
Proof. If G and H have the same vertex set then any edge in G \ H
comprises an augmenting path. Otherwise consider triples (k, P1, P2) where
k is a vertex not in H , P1 is a path from some vertex in H to k, and P2
is a path from k to some vertex in H . Among all such triples choose one
with e (P1) + e (P2) as small as possible. Then P1 and P2 cannot share any
intermediate vertices with H or with each other, else we could construct a
smaller triple. It follows that P = P1 ∪ P2 is an augmenting path.
We are particularly interested in augmenting paths for H that consist of
one or two edges; we refer to these as short augmentations of H .
Corollary 25 If H ⊳ G then G has a minor that is a short augmentation
of H.
Proof. Let K = H∪P be an augmentation ofH . If P has more than two
edges, then we may collapse the first edge of P in K. The resulting graph is
a minor of G, which is again an augmentation of H . The result follows by
iteration.
Lemma 26 If K = H ∪P with P = {jk, kl}, then for any vertex i of H we
have piik (K) = piij (H) + 2.
Proof. The edges (j, k) and (k, l) are the unique incoming and outgoing
edges at k. It follows that every i-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
kl to an i-tree in H , and every k-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
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jk to a j-tree in H . Thus if ajk and akl are the respective weights of the two
edges in the path P then we have
pi (K) = aklpi (H) , pk (K) = ajkpj (H) =⇒
pi (K)
pk (K)
=
akl
ajk
pi (H)
pj (H)
Thus the price ratio in question depends on two additional variables, and the
result follows.
Corollary 27 If G contains the chorded triangle T0 as a proper subgraph
then pi (G) ≥ 5.
Proof. By Corollary 25, G has a minor K = T0 ∪ P , which is a short
augmentation of T0, and it is enough to show that pi (K) ≥ 5. If P consists of
two edges {jk, kl} then by Remark 14 we can choose i such that piij (T0) = 3;
now by Lemma 26, we have cik (K) = 5 and hence pi (K) ≥ 5. If P consists
of a single edge then K is necessarily as below, and once again pi (K) ≥ 5.
2
↑↓ ց
1 ⇆ 3
p1/p3
b31 (b21 + b23)
b23b12 + b23b13 + b21b13
4.5 The circuit rank
As usual G denotes a simple connected graph, and we will write e (G) and
v (G) for the numbers of edges and vertices of G.
Definition 28 The circuit rank of G is defined to be
c (G) = e (G)− v (G) + 1
The circuit rank is also known as the cyclomatic number, and it counts
the number of independent cycles in G, see e.g. [4].
Example 29 If G is a k-rose then c (G) = k, and if G is a chorded cycle
then c (G) = 2.
We now prove a crucial property of c (G).
20
Proposition 30 If H ⊳ G then there is some K E G such that H ⊳ K and
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Proof. Let K = H ∪ P be an augmentation of H . If P consists of
m edges, then K has e (H) + m edges and v (H)+ m − 1 vertices; hence
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Corollary 31 Let G be a connected graph.
1. If H ⊳ G then c (H) < c (G).
2. c (G) = 0 iff G is a single vertex.
3. c (G) = 1 iff G is a cycle.
4. c (G) = 2 iff G is a chorded cycle or a 2-rose.
Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 30, the other parts are
completely straightforward.
Lemma 32 If G is not a rose and c (G) > 3, then there is some K ⊳ G
such that K is not a rose and c (K) = 3.
Proof. Let R be a k-rose in G with c (R) = k as large as possible, then
R ⊳ G by assumption. If c (R) ≤ 2 then any K ⊳ G with c (K) = 3 is not a
rose. Thus we may assume that c (R) > 2, and in particular R has a unique
special vertex i and at least three loops. Since R 6= G, R can be augmented,
and S = R ∪ P is an augmentation, then P cannot both begin and end at i,
else R ∪ P would be a rose, contradicting the maximality of R. Since there
are at most two endpoints of P, we can choose two distinct loops L1 and L2
of R, such that L1∪L2 contains these endpoints of P . Then K = L1∪L2∪P
is the desired graph.
4.6 Covered vertices
Definition 33 Let i be an ordinary vertex of G with outgoing edge ij. We
say that a vertex k covers i, if one of the following holds:
1. the edges ki and kj belong to G
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2. j = k and the edge ki belongs to G
If there is no such k then we say that i is an uncovered vertex.
We emphasize that the terminology covered/uncovered is only applicable
to ordinary vertices in a graph G. The main point of this definition is the
following simple observation.
Remark 34 An ordinary vertex is uncovered iff its outgoing edge is collapsi-
ble.
Lemma 35 Suppose G is a connected graph .
1. If v (G) ≥ 3 then an ordinary vertex cannot cover another vertex.
2. If v (G) ≥ 4 then a binary vertex can cover at most one vertex.
3. A tertiary vertex can cover at most three vertices.
4. If G is a rigid graph with c (G) = 3, then v (G) ≤ 4.
Proof. If k is an ordinary vertex covering i then G must contain the
edges ki and ik. Thus i and k do not have any other outgoing edges, and if
G has a third vertex j then there is no path from k or i to j, which contradicts
the connectedness of G, thereby proving the first statement.
If k is a binary vertex covering the ordinary vertices i and j then G must
contain the edges ki, kj, ij, ji. The vertices i, j, k cannot have any other
outgoing edges, so a fourth vertex would contradict the connectedness of G
as before. This proves the second statement.
If a vertex k covers i then there must be an edge from k to i. Thus if
out(k) = 3 then k can cover at most three vertices.
If c (G) = 3 then G has either 2 binary vertices or 1 tertiary vertex, with
the remaining vertices being ordinary. If v (G) > 4 then by previous two
paragraphs G would have an uncovered vertex, which is a contradiction.
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4.7 Proof of Theorem 16
Proposition 36 If c (G) ≥ 3 and G is not a rose, then pi (G) ≥ 5.
Proof. By Proposition 18 and Lemma 32 we may assume that c (G) = 3.
By Lemma 21, we may further assume that G is rigid, and thus by Lemma
35 that v (G) ≤ 4. We now divide the argument into three cases.
First suppose that G contains a 3-cycle C. We claim that at least one of
the edges of C must be a bidirected edge in G, so that G properly contains
a chorded triangle T0, whence pi (G) ≥ 5 by Corollary 27. Indeed if G has no
other vertices outside C, then G must have 5 edges and 3 vertices and the
claim is obvious. Thus we may suppose that there is an outside vertex l. We
further claim that C contains two vertices i, j such that i covers j. Granted
this, it is immediate that G contains either the bidirected edge ij and ji, or
the bidirected edge jk and kj where k is the third vertex of C. To prove the
“further” claim we note that the special vertices of G consist of either a) one
tertiary vertex, or b) two binary vertices. In case a) the connectedness of G
implies that the tertiary vertex must be in C, and hence it must cover both
the ordinary vertices in C. In case b) either C contains both binary vertices,
one of which must cover the unique ordinary vertex of C; or C contains one
binary vertex, which must cover one of the two ordinary vertices of C.
Next suppose that G does not contain a 3-cycle, but does contain a 4-
cycle labeled 1234, say. Now G has two additional edges, which cannot be
the diagonals 13, 31, 24, 42, since otherwise G would have a 3-cycle; therefore
G must have two bidirected edges. The bidirected edges cannot be adjacent
else G would have a collapsible vertex, therefore G must be the first graph
below, which has pi (G) ≥ 5.
2 −→ 3
↑↓ ↑↓
1 ←− 4
p1/p3
b21b34b41
b23b12 (b41 + b43)
2 ⇄ 3
↑↓ ↑↓
1 4
p1/p4
b21b32b43
b34b23b12
Finally suppose G has no 3-cycles or 4-cycles. Then every edge must be
a bidirected edge, and G must be a tree with all bidirected edges. Since G is
not a star, this only leaves the second graph above, which has pi (G) ≥ 6.
We can now finish the proof of Theorem 16.
Proof of Theorem 16. If c (G) ≤ 2 then, by Corollary 31, G is a single
vertex, a cycle, chorded cycle or a 2-rose. If c (G) ≥ 3 then the result follows
by Proposition 36.
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5 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, after a couple of preliminary results, we apply Theorem 16
to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 37 If G is a chorded cycle on 4 or more vertices, then τ (G) ≥ 3.
Proof. We can express G as a union of two paths P,Q from 1 to 2, say
and a third path R from 2 to 1. At least one of the first two paths, say P
must have an intermediate vertex, say 3. Since m ≥ 4 there is an additional
intermediate vertex 4 on one of the paths.
If m = 4 then we get three possible graphs depending on the location of
the vertex 4.
3 → 4
↑ ↓
1 ⇆ 2
3 → 2
↑ ր ↓
1 ← 4
3 → 2
↑ ւ ↑
1 → 4
For these graphs we have τ24 = 3, τ42 = 3 and τ34 = 3, respectively. Thus
τ (G) ≥ 3 in all three cases.
If m > 4 then G can be realized as one of these graphs, albeit with
additional intermediate vertices on one or more of the paths P,Q,R. These
additional vertices are ordinary uncovered vertices, with collapsible outgoing
edges. Collapsing one of these edges does not increase time complexity, and
produces a smaller chorded cycle G′. Arguing by induction on m we conclude
τ (G) ≥ τ (G′) ≥ 3.
Lemma 38 If G is the complete graph, then piij (G) = m (m− 1) for all
i 6= j.
Proof. Fix a pair of vertices i 6= j in G. Then we claim that the price
ratio pij (G) depends on each of the m (m− 1) edge weights bkl. Indeed if
H is any ”spanning” connected subgraph of G then pij (H) is obtained from
pij (G) by specializing to 0 the weights of all edges outside H . Therefore it
suffices to find a connected subgraph H such that pij (G) depends on bkl.
We consider two cases. If {i, j} = {k, l} then exchanging i, j if necessary
we may assume i = k, j = l. Let H be an m-cycle two of whose edges are ij
and hi (say); then pi/pj = bhi/bij depends on bkl = bij .
If {i, j} 6= {k, l} then let H be an 2-rose with loops C1 and C2 such that
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1. k is the special vertex, and kl is an edge in C1
2. i belongs to C1 and j belongs to C2
Then pi and pj are each given by unique directed trees Ti and Tj. More-
over Ti involves kl while Tj does not. Hence pij (H) depends on bkl.
Proof of Theorem 1. (Completion)Let S denote the set consisting
of the three special mechanisms: star, cycle and complete. We need to
show that M = S, where M denotes the set of -minimal elements of
M = M(m).
Let us say that G is a minimal graph if MG is a minimal mechanism of
M. Now the star mechanism has complexity (τ, pi) = (2, 4). Therefore if G
is any minimal graph then either τ (G) = 1 or pi (G) ≤ 4. For τ (G) = 1
we get the complete graph, which has complexity (τ, pi) = (1, m (m− 1)) by
Lemma 38. The graphs with pi (G) ≤ 4 are characterized by Theorem 16,
and we have three possibilities for G.
1. Chorded cycle. In this case we have (τ, pi) = (3+, 4) by Lemma 37, and
so G is not minimal.
2. Cycle. In this case we have (τ, pi) = (m− 1, 2) by Lemma 12.
3. k-rose, k ≥ 2. If each petal of G has exactly 2 edge then G is the star
mechanism. Otherwise after collapsing edges, we obtain the following
minor with τ12 = 3
1
↓ տ
· → · ⇆ 2
Thus G has complexity (τ, pi) = (3+, 4) and so is not minimal.
Thus the three graphs in the statement of Theorem 1 are the only pos-
sible minimal graphs, and have the indicated complexities. Since they are
incomparable with each other, each is minimal. Thus we conclude M = S
as desired.
Remark 39 For m = 3, Lemma 37 does not hold and we have an additional
strongly minimal mechanism with (τ, pi) = (2, 4), namely the chorded triangle
·
↓ տ
· ⇆ ·
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6 Proof of Theorem 10
Note that a mechanism is determined uniquely by its net trade function
ν(a, b) := r(a, b) − a which, although initially defined for a ≤ b, admits a
natural extension as follows.
Proposition 40 The function ν admits a unique extension to S×S+ satis-
fying
ν(λa+ λ′a′, b) = λν(a, b) + λ′ν(a′, b), ν (a, λb) = ν (a, b) for λ, λ′ > 0
Proof. Since ν(a, b) := r(a, b)− a, it suffices to show
r(λa+ λ′a′, b) = λr(a, b) + λ′r(a′, b), r (a, λb) = r (a, b) for λ, λ′ > 0 (10)
But this is just Lemma 1 of [9], whose proof we now reproduce for the
sake of completeness.
First observe that, by the conservation of commodities, r(a, b) ≤ b for all
a ≤ b; moreover if a and a′ in S are such that a + a′ ≤ b, then Aggregation
implies the functional (Cauchy) equation r(a+ a′, b) = r(a, b) + r(a′, b).
From Corollary 2 in [1] we conclude that, for all non-negative λ and λ′
such that λa+ λ′a′ ≤ b, the first equality of (10) holds.
Next let a ≤ b and choose λ ≥ 1. Then the argument just given shows
that r(λa, λb) = λr(a, λb). On the other hand, Invariance implies that the
left side equals λr(a, b). Comparing these expressions we obtain the second
inequality of (10).
Thus even for a not less than b, we may define r(a, b) via (10) by choosing
λ sufficiently large. This extends r to all of S × S+.
In view of the above result, we drop the restriction a ≤ b when considering
ν (a, b).
The net trade vector can have negative and positive components, and
hence belongs to Rm. The next definition pertains to such vectors in Rm.
Definition 41 By an i-vector, we mean a vector whose ith component is
positive and all other components are zero. By an ı¯j-vector we mean a vector
that has a negative i-component, a positive j-component and zeros in all other
components.
Proposition 42 For b ∈ S+ and any i 6= j there is a ∈ S such that ν(a, b)
is an ı¯j-vector.
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Proof. Since the graph G underlying the mechanism is connected, there
is a directed path from i to j. Denote the nodes on the path by i = 1, . . . , t =
j. Let w1 be an i-vector which can be offered on edge 12 to get a return
w2 6= 0 consisting only of commodity 2 (here w2 6= 0 by Non-dissipation);
then w2 can be offered on edge 23 to get w3 6= 0 consisting only of commodity
3, and so on. This yields a sequence w1, . . . , wt such that
wi + ν
(
wi, b
)
= wi+1 for i = 1, . . . , t− 1
If w =
∑
wi then by Proposition 40 we have
ν (w, b) =
∑
ν
(
wi, b
)
= wt − w1
which is an ı¯j-vector.
It will be convenient to write an ı¯j-vector in the form (−x, y) after sup-
pressing the other components. In the context of the above proposition if
ν (a, b) = (−x, y) then by linearity ν (a/x, b) = (−1, y/x), and we will say
that the offer a (or a/x) achieves an ij-exchange ratio of y/x at b.
Proposition 42 shows that there exists at least one offer a to achieve an
ı¯j-vector in trade, at any given b. But a is by no means unique. There may
be many paths from i to j, along which i can be exchanged exclusively for j;
and, also, there may be more complicated trading strategies, that use edges
no longer confined to any single path, to accomplish such an exchange. These
could give rise to offers different from a and yield (for the fixed aggregate
b) other ı¯j-vectors in trade. But, as the following lemma shows, the same
exchange ratio obtains under all circumstances.
Lemma 43 If a′, a′′achieve ij-exchange ratios α′, α′′ at b, then α′ = α′′.
Proof. By Proposition 42 there exists an a such that ν (a, b) is a j¯i-
vector; if α is the corresponding exchange ratio then by rescaling a, a′, a′′ we
may assume that
ν (a, b) = (1,−α) , ν (a′, b) = (−1, α′) , ν (a′′, b) = (−1, α′′) .
By Proposition 40 we get
ν (a+ a′, b) = (0, α′ − α)
Now by Non-dissipation we get α ≤ α′, and exchanging the roles of i and j
we conclude that α′ ≤ α and hence17 that α = α′. Arguing similarly we get
α = α′′ and hence that α′ = α′′
17Equivalently: no-arbitrage of subsection 3.0.1 directly implies that α = α′.
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Lemma 44 Denote the net trade function of M by ν. Then there is a unique
map p : RK++ → R
m
++/ ∼ satisfying p(b) · ν(a, b) = 0.
Proof. Fix b ∈ S+ and consider the vector
p = (1, p2, . . . , pm)
where p−1j is the 1j-exchange ratio at b, as in Lemma 43. We will show that
p satisfies the budget balance condition, i.e. that
p · ν (a, b) = 0 for all a. (11)
We argue by induction on the number d (a, b) of non-zero components of
ν (a, b) in positions 2, . . . , m. If d (a, b) = 0 then ν (a, b) = 0 by Non-
dissipation (enhanced to no-arbitrage, see Subsection 3.0.1) and (11) is ob-
vious. If d (a, b) = 1 then ν (a, b) is either an 1¯j-vector or a j¯1 vector, which
by the definition of pj and Lemma 43 is necessarily of the form(
−x, xp−1j
)
or
(
x,−xp−1j
)
;
for such vectors (11) is immediate. Now suppose d (a, b) = d > 1 and fix j
such that νj (a, b) 6= 0. Then we can choose a
′ such that ν (a′, b) is a 1¯j or
a j¯1- vector such that νj (a, b) = −νj (a
′, b) . It follows that d (a + a′, b) < d
and by linearity we get
p · ν (a, b) = p · ν (a + a′, b)− p · ν (a′, b) .
By the inductive hypothesis the right side is zero, hence so is the left side.
Finally the uniqueness of the price function is obvious, because the return
function of the mechanism dictates how many units of j may be obtained for
one unit of i, yielding just one possible candidate for the exchange rate for
every pair ij.
We can now prove Theorem 10
Proof. of Theorem 10 (Completion) To prove that M = MG it is
enough to show that p and r satisfy (1) and (3).
Let us write, as before,
b =
∑
aα, p = p(b) and ν (a, b) = r(a, b)− a.
Consider replacing trader α by m traders α1, . . . , αm, where trader αj makes
only the offers
{
aαij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
in aα that entitle α to the return of com-
modity j. By Aggregation this will have no effect on traders other than α;
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and hence αj will get precisely the return rj(a
α, b). By Lemma 44, applied
to each such trader αj , we have
pjrj(a
α, b) =
∑
i
pia
α
ij (12)
which is just (3).
Now (1) follows by summing (12) over all α.
7 A Continuum of Traders
Our analysis easily extends to the case where the set of individuals T is the
unit interval [0, 1], endowed with a nonatomic population measure 18. Let S
denote the collection of all integrable functions a : T 7→ S such that
∫
T
a ∈
S+. (An element of S represents a choice of offers by the traders in T which
are positive on aggregate.) In the same vein, let R denote the collection of
all integrable functions from T to C, whose elements r : T 7→ C represent
returns to T. An exchange mechanism M , on a given set of m commodities,
is a map from S to R such that, if M maps a to r then we have (reflecting
conservation of commodities): ∫
T
a =
∫
T
r
We wrap the Aggregation and Anonymity conditions into one, and directly
postulate that the return to any individual depends only on his own offer and
the integral of everyone’s offers, and that this return function is the same for
everyone. Thus we have a function r from S×S+ to C such that r(t) = r(a, b),
where a = a(t) and b =
∫
T
a. The following lemma is essentially from [7].
Proposition 45 r(a, b) is linear in a (for fixed b) and r(a, λb) = r(a, b) for
any a, b and positive scalar λ.
Proof. We will first show that if a, c ∈ S and 0 < λ < 1, then
r(λa+ (1− λ)c, b) = λr(a, b) + (1− λ)r(c, b)
18Denote the measure µ. And since µ is to be held fixed throughout, we may suppress
it, abbreviating
∫
T
f (t)dµ(t) by
∫
T
f for any measurable function f on [0, 1] .
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There clearly exists an integrable map d from T = [0, 1] to space of of-
fers S such that (i) positive mass of traders choose a in d; (ii) positive
mass of traders choose c in d ; and (iii) the integral of d on T is b. So∫
T
r(dα,b)dµ(α) =
∫
T
r(d,b) = b since commodities are conserved. Shift ελ
mass from a to λa+(1−λ)c and (1−λ)ε mass from c to λa+(1−λ)c , letting
the rest be according to d. This yields a new function (from T to S ) which
we call e. Clearly the integral of e on T is also b. Therefore, once again by
conservation of commodities, we must have
∫
T
r(e,b) = b, hence
∫
T
r(d,b) =∫
T
r(e,b). But this can only be true if the displayed equality holds, proving
that (every coordinate of) r is affine in a for fixed b.
Now r(0, b) ≥ 0 by assumption. Suppose r(0, b)  0. Partition T into
two non-null sets T1 and T2. Consider the case where all the individuals in T1
offer 0, and all in T2 offer b/µ(T2). Then, since everone in T1 gets the return
r(0, b)  0, by conservation of commodities everyone in T2 gets b − µ(T1)
r(0, b)   b/µ(T2), contradicting non-dissipation. So r(0, b) = 0, showing r is
linear.
Finally λr(a, b) = r(λa, λb) = λr(a, λb),where the first equality comes
from Invariance and the second from linearity.
Remark 46 As mentioned in the introduction, when there is a continuum
of traders, the star mechanism leads to equivalence (or, near-equivalence) of
Nash and Walras equilibria under suitable postulates regarding the commodity
or fiat money. (See [8] for a detailed discussion.)
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